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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF
FEDERAL CONTROL OVER THE SOVEREIGN
TAXING AUTHORITY OF THE STATES
Archie Parnell*
In 1959, the Supreme Court decided the companion cases of Northwest-
ern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and Williams v. Stockham
Valves and Fittings, Inc. I The Court held in those cases that a state may
constitutionally impose a fairly apportioned net income tax on an out-of-
state corporation engaged only in interstate business within the taxing
state. In response to those cases, Congress enacted Public Law 86-272,2
which established minimum jurisdictional requirements that must be met
before a state can impose and assess a net income tax on income derived
from interstate commerce. The statute contained an additional title di-
recting congressional committees to recommend to the Congress "pro-
posed legislation providing uniform standards to be observed by the states
in imposing income taxes on income" derived from interstate commerce.
3
Although Congress has not yet established uniform standards for states
imposing taxes on income derived from interstate commerce,4 there have
* Mr. Parnell is currently Senior Staff Counsel to the Ways and Means Oversight Sub-
committee of the United States House of Representatives. The views expressed herein are
entirely those of the author and should not be attributed to any member of the Ways and
Means Committee or its staff. The author wishes to express his appreciation to William
Shraberg of the Tax Division of the United States Department of Justice for his assistance in
the preparation of this article.
1. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). For a discussion of these cases, see text accompanying notes
29-35 infra.
2. Act of Sept. 4, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381 to
384 (1976)). See text accompanying notes 70-75 infra for a discussion of this law.
3. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, § 201, 73 Stat. 555.
4. To date Congress has supplemented Pub. L. No. 86-272 four times. The first sup-
plement, the Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-44, § 1113, 87
Stat. 907 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976)) prohibits states from imposing "a tax, fee,
head charge, or other charge, directly or indirectly" with respect to air commerce. Section
1513(b), however, permits a state to impose property taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes,
and sales or use taxes with respect to air commerce. The second supplement, the Securities
Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 21, 89 Stat. 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(d) (1976)), restricts state taxation with regard to the change in beneficial or record
ownership of securities based only on the physical location of the facilities of registered
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been numerous attempts to do so. Most recently, Senator Mathias intro-
duced S. 2173,1 a rather comprehensive bill that provided jurisdictional
guidelines for states imposing gross receipts taxes as well as sales or use
taxes.6 Moreover, S. 2173 mandated the use of an apportionment formula
for the allocation of interstate corporate income for state income tax pur-
poses.
7
As with earlier versions of bills that would have restricted state taxation
of all taxpayers engaged in interstate commerce, the approach of S. 2173
varied from the government's approach taken during a recent Senate de-
bate over the proposed Tax Convention with the United Kingdom. 8 The
proposed treaty stirred substantial controversy, particularly with regard to
article 9(4),9 which would have restricted a state's use of any formula for
clearing agencies or registered transfer agents. The third, the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90 Stat. 531 (codified at 49
U.S.C.A. § 26c (West Supp. 1978)), prohibits states from taxing railroad property more
heavily than other industrial and commercial property. The last, the Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2121(a), 90 Stat. 521 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976)), re-
stricts states from imposing a tax on the generation or transmission of electricity which
thereby discriminates against out-of-state producers or consumers. For a full discussion of
these statutes, see notes 76-84 and accompanying text infra.
5. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). S. 2173 is reproduced, together with a statement by
Senator Mathias, at 123 CONG. REC. S16232-35. (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1977). Although Con-
gress adjourned without acting on S. 2173, Senator Mathias intends to reintroduce the bill
during the 96th Congress. See [1978] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) J-1 (Nov. 15, 1978). For
further discussion of this proposal, see text accompanying notes 93-97 and 104-111 infra.
When first introducing S. 2173, Senator Mathias summarized the substantial congres-
sional activity in the area of state imposed income tax on income derived from interstate
commerce. 123 CONG. REC. S 16232 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Mathias). See,
e.g., Interstate Taxation Act." Hearings on H.R. 11798 Before the Special Subcomm. on State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966); S. 2080, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
6. S. 2713, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 101 through 212 (1977), reprinted in 123 CONG.
REc. S16232 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1977).
7. S. 2173, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 301-19, 123 CONG. REC. at S16233 (daily ed. Oct. 4,
1977).
8. Tax Convention with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
reprinted in EXEC. REP. No. 95-18, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)[hereinafter cited as Tax Con-
vention]. Article 10 of the proposed treaty included a provision for a refund by the United
Kingdom of its Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) to United States' shareholders of British
corporations.
On April 25, 1978, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably reported the pro-
posed Tax Convention and recommended that the Senate ratify it by giving its "advice and
consent." Id. at 1. Such "advice and consent" is required by Article II of the Constitution,
which mandates: "[the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties .... " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
9. Art. 9(4) of the proposed Tax Convention stated:
Except as specifically provided in this Article, in determining the tax liability of an
enterprise doing business in a Contracting State, or in a political subdivision or
local authority of a Contracting State, such Contracting State, political subdivision,
[Vol. 28:227
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determining taxable income of British branch operations and businesses
directly or indirectly controlled by British enterprises. Under the com-
bined reporting method, the only method feasible for taxing international
businesses, income is allocated for state income tax purposes by an appor-
tionment formula that takes into account the sales, payroll, and property
values of a business within the state. These features are then compared
with the total worldwide sales, payroll, and property values of all corpora-
tions related by common ownership and operation to the entity doing busi-
ness within the state wherever located.' 0 This arbitrary method obviates
the tremendous administrative difficulties that a state would encounter if
attempting to account separately for business income within a state in
which the activities of a unitary business" were also carried on outside the
state's borders.
State tax administrators, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, expressed concern over possible adverse effects that article
9(4) restrictions would have on the states. In addition to arguing that
states presently using the combined reporting method would suffer a reve-
or local authority shall not take into account the income, deductions, receipts, or
outgoings of a related enterprise of the other Contracting State or of an enterprise
of any third State related to an enterprise of the other Contracting State.
Tax Convention, supra note 8, at 60-61.
10. A three factor combined reporting allocation formula that takes into account sales,
payroll, and property values is constructed as follows:
Intrastate Sales Intrastate Payroll + In-State Property
Worldwide Sales Worldwide Payroll Worldwide Property
The resulting fraction is divided by three (as a result of the three factors) and is then multi-
plied by worldwide business income. The result is income attributable to the state. In 1964,
twenty-six states used a three factor formula; two states used a two factor formula; and three
states used a one factor apportionment formula. See H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 170 (1964). Since states use different allocation formulas, it is possible for the same
income to be taxed twice because identical income can be attributed to different states using
different formulas. A more detailed description of the combined reporting method, also
known as the unitary method, can be found in Tax Treaties with the U.K., the Republic of
Korea, and the Republic of the Philppines Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 151-59 (1977) (statement of Theodore W. deLooze) [herein-
after cited as 1977 Hearings]. )
11. A unitary business is a group of two or more corporations in which: (1) generally
more than 50% of the voting stock of each member corporation is directly or indirectly
owned by a common owner or owners, and (2) each member corporation is engaged in
activities that are integrated with or dependent upon the activities of the entire group of
corporations. See, e.g., Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 678, 111 P.2d 334, 341
(1941). See also Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
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nue loss should article 9(4) be enacted,' 2 the administrators expressed fear
that such a restriction would serve as precedent for further federal en-
croachment on state taxing powers.' 3 It was also argued that the treaty
process was not the proper method for imposing such a restriction on the
states; rather, it was suggested that if such a restriction was ever to be ap-
propriate, it should be adopted through the legislative process after open
debate in both Houses of the Congress.
14
To the delight of those administrators who testified, the Senate ratified
the Tax Convention with the United Kingdom but reserved article 9(4).1'
On the other hand, the threat of similar restrictions in future tax treaties, 16
as well as the potential for future laws to establish a restrictive uniform
method for all states in their apportionment of the income of multistate
and multinational businesses, continues to haunt the same state tax admin-
istrators.
Implicit in the arguments against article 9(4), as well as against future
treaty provisions and bills restricting state taxation of income derived from
interstate commerce, is the thought that such restrictions simply take away
too much of the sovereignty possessed by the states. These arguments are
based upon constitutional considerations 17 and concern the interplay
12. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 10, at 63-70 (testimony of Daniel G. Smith, Presi-
dent, National Association of Tax Administrators).
13. Id. at 64-66.
14. Id. at 44 (statement of Paul J. Oosterhuis, Legislation Counsel, Joint Comm. on
Taxation). This point of view was also expressed in a letter dated July 18, 1977 from Chair-
man Al Ullman of the House Ways and Means Committee to former Chairman John Spark-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reprinted in id. at 3-4.
15. 124 CONG. REC. S9840-42 (daily ed. June 27, 1978). Following Senate ratification,
the revised treaty must be renegotiated with Great Britain. That country is currently in the
process of evaluating the treaty without the article 9(4) restrictions. [1978] DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA) G-2 (Nov. 6, 1978).
16. For example, in June, 1978, the Treasury Department announced that a public
meeting would be held concerning negotiations to develop a new income tax treaty between
the United States and Italy. 43 Fed. Reg. 26816 (1978). That announcement suggests that a
similar restriction could be negotiated in that tax treaty.
17. It should be noted that the constitutional prohibitions apply with equal force to both
laws and treaties. Article VI (the supremacy clause) of the United States Constitution man-
dates: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .. " U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. One
might be tempted to argue, based upon the language of the supremacy clause, and the
Supreme Court's significant decision in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), that laws
and treaties are somehow different and are therefore to be judged by different standards.
The Supreme Court in Holland stated:
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of
the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the author-
ity of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United
States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention. We do
[Vol. 28:227
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among the tenth amendment, 18 the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, 19 the commerce clause, 20 and the necessary and proper
clause.21 These considerations go to the heart of the relationship between
the federal government and the states in our constitutionally based federal
form of government. This article will discuss the constitutional limitations
on the states' power of taxation and examine the federal government's re-
strictions on this power. It will also suggest several approaches for future
congressional attempts to restrict the states' taxing authority.
I. THE POWER TO TAX AS RETAINED BY THE STATES
In the landmark decision of M'Culloch v. Maryland,22 the Supreme
Court recognized the states' sovereign power of taxation. Chief Justice
Marshall stated:
not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but
they must be ascertained in a different way.
Id. at 433.
The Supreme Court's position with regard to the standard against which treaties are to be
judged shifted some thirty-seven years later, as illustrated by the well-reasoned opinion of
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957). The Court there concluded that treaties and laws are
alike in that both must comply with the Constitution. Justice Black, writing for the majority,
stated that the difference in language found in the supremacy clause with regard to treaties
and laws is a result of the attempt by the framers of the Constitution to make clear that
treaties made by the United States while operating under the Articles of Confederation
would remain in effect. Id. at 16-17. Justice Black concluded:
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitu-
tion, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights-let alone alien to
our entire constitutional history and tradition-to construe Article VI as permitting
the United States to exercise power under an international agreement without ob-
serving constitutional prohibitions.
Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
Even though Justice Black's discussion of the supremacy clause is merely dictum, since
the case concerned an executive agreement, the historical context in which he analyzed the
supremacy clause provides a reasonable basis for such a construction of the clause.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
19. The fourteenth amendment states in relevant part: "[no State shall] deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
20. "The Congress shall have the power. . . (t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States .... " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
21. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 18 states: "The Congress shall have the power ... [t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
ing powers. .. "
22. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) In M'Culloch, the Supreme Court held that the crea-
tion of the Bank of the United States was a valid exercise of congressional power and that a
Maryland bank tax, as applied to a branch of the Bank of the United States, was unconstitu-
tional.
19791
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[Tlhat the power of taxation is one of vital importance; that it is
retained by the states; that it is not abridged by the grant of simi-
lar power to the government of the Union; that it is to be concur-
rently exercised by two governments: [these] are truths which
have never been denied. 23
Thus it is clear that the constitutional delegation to the federal govern-
ment of the "power to lay and collect Taxes"'24 is not an exclusive delega-
tion of power. In fact, the founding fathers, when framing our federal
system of government, envisioned practically "uncontrolled" state taxing
powers. Alexander Hamilton, writing under the name Publius, stated in
The Federalist that "the individual States would, under the proposed con-
stitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise reve-
nues to any extent of which they may stand in need by every kind of
taxation except duties on imports and exports. '2
5
The recognition of the sovereign state power to tax, however, does not
mean that the state taxing power may be exercised indiscriminately. The
Constitution expressly prohibits states from imposing taxes on imports or
exports,26 as well as from imposing any tonnage duties.27 Moreover, the
courts on numerous occasions have construed the commerce clause as a
limitation on state taxation when such taxation would interfere substan-
tially with the national economy.28 In fact, the Supreme Court has de-
cided so many controversies concerning the limitaton of the commerce
clause in regard to state taxing schemes that Justice Clark, speaking for the
23. Id at 425.
24. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (A. Hamilton) at 258 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
26. No State Shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Du-
ties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its Inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any
State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United
States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the
Congress.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 2.
27. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3 states: "No State shall, without the Consent of Con-
gress, lay any Duty of Tonnage .... " The Supreme Court stated in Clyde Mallory Lines
v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1935), that this "prohibition against tonnage duties has
been deemed to embrace all taxes and duties. . . which operate to impose a charge for the
privilege of entering, trading in or lying in a port .... "
28. Eg., Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (New York
transfer tax on securities transactions taxing out-of-state transactions more heavily than in-
state transactions); Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963) (application of the
Louisiana use tax against the cost of out-of-state assembling of machinery parts purchased
outside the state); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (Arkansas sales tax
imposed on the sale of goods in which title passed in Tennessee); Hale v. Bimco, 306 U.S.
375 (1939) (Florida "inspection fee" imposed only on out-of-state cement).
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Court in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,29 com-
mented, "[tlhis Court alone has handed down some three hundred full-
dress opinions spread through slightly more than that number of our re-
ports."
30
In Northwestern States, the Court analyzed several prior decisions3' and
summarized them as:
stand[ing] for the doctrine that the entire net income of a
corporaton, generated by interstate as well as intrastate activities,
may be fairly apportioned among the states for tax purposes by
formulas utilizing in-state aspects of interstate affairs. In fact, in
Bass, Ratcliffand Gretton the operations in the taxing state were
conducted at a loss, and still the court allowed part of the over-all
net profit . . to be attributed to the State.
32
The holding in Northwestern States and the later decison of the Supreme
Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady33 clearly illustrate that the
29. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
30. Id at 457-58. The tax involved in Northwestern States was a Minnesota income tax
imposed on an Iowa corporation which owned no real estate in Minnesota, maintained no
bank accounts there, and warehoused no merchandise in the state. The corporation did,
however, regularly solicit orders for the sale of its products in Minnesota. The net income
derived from this activity provided a sufficient connection with Minnesota for state tax pur-
poses. The tax involved in Williams v. Stockham Valves and Fittings, Inc., the companion
case to Northwestern States, was a Georgia income tax imposed on a Delaware corporation
that did not maintain any warehouse or storage facilities in Georgia but did maintain a sales
and service office in the state. As in Northwestern States, the net income derived from the
activity in Georgia provided a sufficient connection with Georgia for state tax purposes.
31. The major cases the Northwestern court analyzed were Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton,
Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924) and Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. North Caro-
lina, 297 U.S. 682 (1936).
Bass considered the constitutionality of New York's franchise tax determined by use of an
allocation formula against a British corporation selling ale in New York. The Court found
that New York possessed the power to attribute a proper proportion of the "unitary busi-
ness," see note I I supra, income to New York for tax purposes.
The issue before the Supreme Court in Norfolk & W Ry. was the constitutionality of a
North Carolina statute that mandated the use of a formula allocating income and operating
costs by comparing the mileage of railway tracks within the state against the entire mileage
of a railroad company throughout the country. In upholding the state's apportionment
formula, the Court noted: "A division of revenues and costs in accordance with state lines
can never be made for a unitary business with more than approximate correctness." 297
U.S. at 684.
32. 358 U.S. at 460. Although the Court's language in Northwestern States regarding the
Bass case, see note 31 supra, initially suggests that a tax may be imposed when the opera-
tions within a state are conducted at a loss, the Court in Bass convincingly reasoned that the
company's profits were the result of a series of transactions. Accordingly, since "the process
of manufacturing result[s] in no profits until it ends in sales-the State was justified in attrib-
uting to New York a just proportion of the profits earned .... " 266 U.S. at 282.
33. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). The Supreme Court held in Complete Auto Transit that a Mis-
sissippi tax on the "privilege of doing business" was not per se unconstitutional under the
commerce clause merely because the tax was applied to an activity performed partially in
1979]
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commerce clause limitation on the sovereign state taxing powers does not
create an exemption from state taxation for businesses engaged in inter-
state commerce. Rather, these decisions indicate that businesses engaged
in interstate commerce must pay their fair share of state taxes, 34 and that
only when state taxing schemes substantially burden interstate commerce
will the commerce clause restrict such taxing methods. 35
Even though a state tax may withstand a constitutional challenge based
on the commerce clause, such a tax may nevertheless violate the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment.36 To establish that a state taxing
statute is discriminatory under the due process clause and therefore uncon-
stitutional, however, the taxpayer must show that the statute favors local
business over interstate business by, for example, impermissibly confiscat-
ing property of the interstate business. To illustrate, the Supreme Court in
A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton37 held that an excise tax of fifteen cents per
pound imposed on all butter substitutes sold within a state did not violate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court acknowl-
edged the magnitude of the state taxing power by comparing it to that
concurrently exercised by the federal government. The Court stated that
interstate commerce. The Court expressly overruled its earlier decision in Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), in which the Court had prohibited a state
from imposing a tax on the "privilege" of engaging in interstate commerce without violating
the commerce clause. See also Central R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962) (com-
merce clause not a bar against the imposition of Pennsylvania's property tax on the full
value of the company's railroad freight cars, even though a determinable portion of the
freight cars were outside Pennsylvania for a portion of the tax year); Capital Greyhound
Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950) (Maryland tax of 2% of the fair market value of vehicles
operated on Maryland highways upheld regardless of whether vehicle owner was engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce).
34. As noted in Complete Auto Transit, "the Court consistently has indicated that 'inter-
state commerce may be made to pay its way ... '" 430 U.S. at 281.
35. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). See text accompanying notes 63-
67 infra. See generally Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Taxation-Recent Revolutions
and a Modern Response, 29 VAND. L. REV. 423 (1976).
36. Eg., America Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965) (state imposition of an excise tax
upon a dealer entirely disassociated from any in-state activities violates due process); Frick
v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925) (imposition of inheritance taxes on the transfer of tan-
gible property located outside a state is a deprivation of property without due process of
law).
It should also be noted that the Court in Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975),
struck down a New Hampshire commuters' income tax as violative of the privileges and
immunities clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The Court construed the clause as prohib-
iting the making of nonresidence or noncitizenship as the basis for imposing a tax burden.
Taxpayers have also attempted to invalidate state taxes on the basis of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. These attempts
have generally failed. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973);
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
37. 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
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the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment will prohibit state tax-
ation only if it is "so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not
involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and
effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as, for exam-
ple, the confiscation of property .... *38
Thus, although state sovereign power of taxation is recognized as a vital
state exercise, it cannot be allowed to violate other constitutional man-
dates. Within these limits, however, state taxation has been generally rec-
ognized as a constitutional exercise of power.
II. CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATONS ON THE STATES'
SOVEREIGN POWER TO TAX
.4. Congressional Regulation of Interstate Commerce
Even though a state's method of taxing interstate business does not vio-
late the commerce or due process clauses, that same taxing scheme may
nonetheless be restricted by Congress. Restrictions of this nature are not
based on any unconstitutional state action but rather on Congress'
determinaton that such restrictions are necessary to ensure the free flow of
interstate commerce. 39 Thus, pursuant to its power to regulate commerce,
Congress has enacted several laws that restrict state taxation of interstate
businesses.n
Congressional power under the commerce clause is sweeping. The
38. Id. at 44.
39. For example, the Supreme Court in South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1937), in discussing state and federal regulation of highways, stated:
"Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate interstate commerce, may deter-
mine whether the burdens imposed on it by state regulation, otherwise permissible, are too
great, and may, by legislation designed to secure uniformity. . . curtail to some extent the
state's regulatory power." Id. at 189-190 (emphasis added). The rationale set forth in South
Carolina Highway Dep't was adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in International Shoe
Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964), to uphold
the constitutionality of Public Law 86-272, which established minimum jurisdictional stand-
ards before a state can impose a net income tax on income derived from interstate com-
merce. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 381 to 384 (1976); notes 70-75 and accompanying text, infra.
The mere fact that Congress has not acted in a certain area does not mean that it is
thereafter foreclosed from doing so. See generally Biklk, The Silence of Congress, 41 HARV.
L. REV. 200 (1927). This proposition was made clear in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by virtue of the commerce clause. Prior to the Civil Rights
Act, Congress had not attempted to prohibit discrimination in a comprehensive way. None-
theless, congressional failure to exercise its commerce clause power in the civil rights context
did not preclude it from doing so. Thus, in Heart fAtlanta, that exercise was constitu-
tional.
40. See text accompanying notes 70-84 infra.
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Supreme Court has recognized that this clause "is complete in itself, may
be exercised [by Congress] to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limi-
tations, other than are prescribed in the constitution."' 41 In addition, the
necessary and proper clause allows Congress to legislate concerning mat-
ters that are technically not included in its commerce clause power, but
which are necessary to effectuate the underlying federal policy of the
clause.42 The limits of the necessary and proper clause power were enunci-
ated at an early date in M'Culloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are ap-
propriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional."
43
The question of whether the federal government is constitutionally re-
stricted in limiting the states' taxing power requires an analysis of the ex-
tent of express congressional power under the commerce clause, as well as
the scope of implied powers endowed by the necessary and proper clause,
to effectuate a legitimate commerce-related end. It is undisputed that the
congressional power to regulate commerce is as vast as the national
economy 44 and that it subsumes both the enumerated commerce clause
power as well as the necessary and proper clause power. 45 Vastness, how-
ever, cannot be properly defined as that which is without limits. The very
fact that other powers are granted to Congress in article I, section 8 of the
Constitution indicates that the power to regulate commerce is limited to
some degree.46 Otherwise, no other grant of power would have been
deemed necessary. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that
Congress' commerce power has limits. In a recent decision, the Court
noted that it "has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of
41. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
42. For the text of the necessary and proper clause, see note 21 supra. During, as well
as after, the ratification of the Constitution, there was disagreement as to the extent of the
power granted the federal government by virtue of the necessary and proper clause. See
generally I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 499, 500-03
(1922). The concept evolved, however, that the necessary and proper clause "is not the
delegation of a new and independent power, but simply provision for making effective" the
enumerated powers found in article I, section 8 of the Constitution. Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46, 88 (1907). See generally Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitu-
tional Law, 29 YALE L.J. 137 (1919).
43. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
44. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (dis-
cussed in note 39 supra); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (congressional power to
regulate commerce justifies the federal regulation of commodities prices and practices affect-
ing such prices).
45. See note 42 supra.
46. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1-17.
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Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise
plenary" power to regulate commerce.
47
The pertinent constitutional limitation on Congress' power to regulate
commerce by restricting state taxing power is, of course, the very sover-
eignty of state taxing authority, implicitly recognized by the tenth amend-
ment.48 The Supreme Court's assessment in Fry v. United States of the
tenth amendment's recognition of state sovereign powers is revealing:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'tru-
ism,' stating merely that 'all is retained which has not been sur-
rendered,' . . . it is not without significance. The Amendment
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
49
This dicta in Fry expressing that Congress may not exercise power that
would impair the ability of the states to function in our federal system of
government was made the basis for the later Supreme Court decision in
National League of Cities v. Usery.50 In National League of Cities, the
47. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976). See Salmon, The
Federalist Princile." The Interaction of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment in the
Clean Air Act, 2 COLUM. J. OF ENVT'L L. 290 (1976). Arguing that the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857 to 18571 (1976), should be adjudged unconstitutional, the author observed:
If the Congress, using the virtually inexhaustible resources of the . . .[commerce
clause power] and the power permitted by the Necessary and Proper Clause, can
subordinate to its uses all state functions which impinge on "commerce" ... then
federalism as it was thought to exist has changed radically and fundamentally
* We have not a federal, but a national system of government.
Salmon, supra at 296.
48. See note 18 supra.
49. 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
(194 1)). Although the Supreme Court in Fry concluded that the Economic Stabilization Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) (expired April 30, 1974), was constitutional as ap-
plied to state and local government employees, it noted that "we are convinced that the wage
restriction regulations constituted no. . .drastic invasion of state sovereignty." 421 U.S. at
547 n.7.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Fry, argued that Congress had encroached too heavily on
an area of traditional state functions. Id. at 549-59. He distinguished arguments attacking
federal acts not within congressional authority under the commerce clause from those at-
tacks grounded on constitutional rights. Thus, Ohio, in arguing the Act as applied to state
employees was violative of the tenth amendment, claimed it was "not simply asserting an
absence of congressional legislative authority, but rather [was] asserting an affirmative con-
stitutional right, inherent in its capacity as a State, to be free from such congressionally
asserted authority." Id. at 553. Whether such a claim would prevail was "quite a different
question," but an overriding deference to congressional authority would be "simply a denial
of the inherent affirmative constitutional limitation on congressional power which [Justice
Rehnquist] believe[sJ the States possess." Id. See also United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570 (1968) (congressional exercise of its commerce clause power invalid when the resultant
legislative enactment conflicts with the constitutional right to trial by jury).
50. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Court determined that Congress' power to regulate commerce was not so
exclusive and unlimited as to permit Congress to impose the minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 51
upon most employees of state and local governments. The Court stated:
Congress may not exercise [its commerce clause power] . . . so as
to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential
decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental func-
tions are to be made. We agree that such assertions of power, if
unchecked, would indeed. . . allow 'the National Government
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty' . . . and would
therefore transgress the bounds of the authority granted Congress
52
Both National League of Cities and Fry indicate that there are aspects of
state sovereignty that cannot be regulated constitutionally by Congress and
that the tenth amendment is an "express declaration" that "our federal
system of government imposed definite limits upon the authority of Con-
gress to regulate the activities of the States as States by means of the com-
merce power." 53 The Court concluded in National League of Cities that
"insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional gov-
ernmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress
. . . by the commerce clause."'54 Whether state taxing power is a "tradi-
tional governmental function" has not yet been expressly decided, how-
ever. Nonetheless, since the economic viability of state governments
depends upon the power to tax, and because the taxing power is a legiti-
mate function of the state as a sovereign, state taxation should clearly
qualify as a "traditional governmental function."
This conclusion is amply supported by Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist:
[t]hough a law, therefore, for laying a tax for the use of the United
States would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be
opposed or controlled; yet, a law abrogating or preventing the
collection of a tax laid by the authority of a state (unless upon
imports and exports) would not be the supreme law of the land,
but an usurpation of power, not granted by the constitution.
55
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219 (1976).
52. 426 U.S. at 855 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
53. Id. at 842.
54. Id at 852.
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (A. Hamilton) at 208 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Furthermore,
the Supreme Court recognized at an early date that "the power of taxation is indispensable
to [the states'] existence . . . . " Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
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The continued vitality of the compact made between the states and the
federal government in 1789 is underscored in National League of Cities. It
remains open to question, however, whether the states' freedom to select
various methods of taxation will come within the umbrella of traditional
governmental functions integrally related to state operation and protected
by National League of Cities.
B. A Balancing Approach
In his concurring opinion in NationalLeague of Cities, Justice Blackmun
characterized the majority's analysis as a balancing approach. 56 Such an
approach to the relationship between the commerce clause and state taxa-
tion has apparently been recognized by the Supreme Count for years. For
example, in McGoldrick v. Berwind- White Coal Mining Co. , the Court
stated that prior cases testing the validity of state and local taxes had bal-
anced the competing constitutional demands at stake. The Court identi-
fied the concern that "commerce between the states shall not be unduly
impeded by state action, and that the power to lay taxes for the support of
state government shall not be unduly curtailed. s58 Thirty-seven years
later, the need for an accommodation was reiterated in Boston Stock Ex-
change v. State Tax Commission.59 The Supreme Court recognized the
necessity for "the delicate adjustment between the national interest in free
and open trade and the legitimate interest of the individual States in exer-
cising their taxing powers .... -60 Consequently, the constitutional anal-
ysis of any federal limitation on the states' taxing power must balance the
congressional power to regulate commerce and the states' sovereign power
to tax as recognized by the tenth amendment.
The Supreme Court has indicated that it would allow certain congres-
sional intercession in the area of state taxation of interstate trade. In
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota,61 the Court upheld Minnesota's per-
sonal property tax as applied to Northwest Airlines' entire fleet of air-
56. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
57. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
58. Id. at 48. In McGoldrick, the Supreme Court determined that the application of a
New York sales tax to the delivery of coal shipped from Pennsylvania pursuant to contracts
of sale previously made in New York did not violate the commerce clause.
59. 429 U.S. 318 (1977). At issue in Boston Stock Exchange was a New York transfer
tax on securities transactions that taxed out-of-state transactions more heavily than in-state
transactions. Finding the tax unconstitutional, the Court emphasized that the fundamental
purpose of the commerce clause is to protect and preserve free trade among the states. Id. at
335. Since a tax that favors in-state transactions is in direct conflict with the purpose of the
commerce clause, such a tax is constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 336.
60. Id. at 329.
61. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
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planes. Although not all the airplanes were in the state during the taxable
year, the Court found that taxing the company violated neither the com-
merce clause nor the due process clause. Although the tax was upheld,
Justice Frankfurter nevertheless indicated that Congress could have "ex-
ert[ed] its controlling authority over commerce by appropriate regulation
and exclude[d] a domiciliary State from authority which it otherwise
would have .... ,,62
Most recently, in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bai, 63 the Supreme
Court upheld Iowa's single-factor sales formula for apportioning interstate
business income.64 The Court observed, however, that although states
were generally free to mandate methods for the allocation of income de-
rived from interstate commerce, that freedom
may have to yield to an overriding national interest in uniformity
... . It is clear that the legislative power granted to Congress by
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply justify
the enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere to uni-
form rules for the division of income.
65
It is important to note that although the Court recognized Congress' power
to mandate uniformity, it premised this conclusion with the statement that
"the content of any uniform rules to which they must subscribe should be
determined only after due consideration is given to the interest of all af-
fected States."' 66 This dictate suggests that in future cases involving federal
62. Id. at 298.
63. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
64. Iowa's single factor formula compares gross sales in Iowa with total gross sales of an
interstate business. Id. at 269 n. 1. The resulting fraction is then multiplied by adjusted total
net income to determine the amount of taxable income attributable to Iowa. Id. at 270 n.3.
The Iowa taxable income amount is then multiplied by the Iowa tax rate and the result is the
tax obligation. Id. Since the majority of other states use the three factor formula, see foot-
note 10 supra, which takes into account not only sales, but also payroll and property, there is
a greater likelihood of double taxation of the same income of those companies that do busi-
ness in Iowa and states that use a three factor formula. See generally Studenski, The Need
for Federal Curbs on State Taxes on Interstate Commerce. An Economist's Viewpoint, 46 VA.
L. REV. 1121, 1133 (1960). Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, however, dealt with
the double taxation argument by terming it "speculative," 437 U.S. at 276. He concluded
that the record did not establish that there had been, in fact, duplicative taxation. Id. To
eliminate the risk of duplication, the Court would have to "prescribe a uniform definition of
each category in the three-factor formula," a task better left to Congress since such a uni-
form code "would require a policy decision based on political and economic considerations
that vary from state to state." Id. at 278-79.
Justice Powell, dissenting, differed from the majority on the detrimental effect of the state
law. He concluded that the law violated the commerce clause because "[i]n the context of
virtually universal use of the basic three-factor formula, Iowa's use of the single-factor sales
formula necessarily discriminated against out-of-state manufacturers. Id. at 297 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).




regulation of state taxation, courts must first recognize the sovereignty of
the states' taxing power, and then strive to balance that power against Con-
gress' power to regulate commerce.
67
C. An Analysis of Existing Federal Laws Limiting State Taxation of
Interstate Business
Following the Northwestern States decision,68 in which the Supreme
Court gave its imprimatur to state and local taxation of an interstate busi-
ness based on sales activity within the jurisdiction, many multistate busi-
nesses pressured Congress for legislation delimiting the sweep of the
decision. 69 As a result, Congress has passed several acts to restrict state
taxation of interstate business. Public Law 86-272, the first of the acts
following Northwestern States, established minimum jurisdictional prereq-
uisites for a state-imposed income tax on multistate businesses, mandating
a significant nexus between a state and business activity before the exercise
of a state's sovereign power to tax.70 Essentially, the statute requires busi-
ness activity beyond the mere solicitation of orders or the maintenance of
an office by nonemployees. 7 1 Mere solicitation of orders would be suffi-
cient business activity for the imposition of an income tax only when a
corporation is incorporated in the state or an individual is either a resident
67. Even Justice Powell, with whom Justice Blackmun joined in dissenting, recognized
that the Court's duty was to "'make the delicate adjustment between the national interest in
free and open trade and the legitimate interest of the individual States in exercising their
taxing powers.' " Id. at 283 (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S.
318, 329 (1977)).
68. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). See notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra.
69. MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, preamble at C-3.
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 381 to 384 (1976). For a full discussion of this Act, see Hartman,
"Solicitation and Delivery" under Pub. L. No. 86-272. An Uncharted Course, 29 VAND. L.
REV. 353 (1976).
71. The first section of Public Law 86-272 states:
No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for any taxa-
ble year . . . a net income tax on the income derived within such State by any
person from interstate commerce if the only business activities within such State by
or on behalf of such person during such taxable year are either, or both, of the
following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such
State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the
State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or deliv-
ery from a point outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such
State in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person,
if orders by such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders
resulting from such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).
15 U.S.C. §§ 381(a)(1) and (2) (1976).
19791
Catholic University Law Review
of the state or is domiciled there.72 As recognized by the Supreme Court in
Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 73 however, Congress did
not mandate in Public Law 86-272 a particular method for determining
any state income tax; instead the Act only sets jurisdictional parameters.
This statute survived a direct constitutional challenge in International Shoe
Co. v. Cocreham. 74 Upholding the statute's constitutionality, the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court emphasized that Congress may exercise its power
under the commerce clause to prohibit the imposition of a state tax when
such a tax "unduly burdens the free flow of . . .commerce.
75
In section seven of the Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973,76
Congress expressly prohibited states from imposing taxes or other
"charges" with respect to air commerce. Congress was careful, however,
not to be too restrictive and allowed states to impose property taxes, net
income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales or use taxes with respect to air
commerce.77 Like Public Law 86-272, this statute also survived a constitu-
tional challenge. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Allegheny Airlines,
72. The second section of Public Law 86-272 describes these limits:
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the imposition
of a net income tax by any State, or political subdivision thereof, with respect to-
(1) any corporation which is incorporated under the laws of such State; or
(2) any individual who, under the laws of such State, is domiciled in, or a
resident of, such State.
15 U.S.C. §§ 381(b)(1) and (2) (1976).
73. 409 U.S. 275 (1972). As noted by the Court, Congress enacted Public Law 86-272
primarily to allay the "apprehension of businessmen that 'mere solicitation' would subject
them to state taxation" pursuant to the Court's decision in the Northwestern States case. Id.
at 280.
74. 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964).
75. 246 La. at 257, 164 So. 2d at 319. The court rejected the argument that the Act
impinged upon the state's power to tax, as reserved in the tenth amendment. Deferring to
congressional authority, the court concluded "[s]ince Congress has admittedly plenary
power to regulate commerce, it follows, of course, that it had the power to find as a fact that
the enactment of P.L. 86-272 was essential to prevent an undue burden to the free flow of
commerce between the States." 246 La. at 262, 164 So. 2d at 321.
76. 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976). Section 1513(a) states: "No State (or political subdivision
thereof. . .) shall levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other charge, directly or indi-
rectly, on persons traveling in air commerce or on the carriage of persons traveling in air
commerce or on the sale of air transportation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom."
77. Section 1513(b) provides:
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a State (or political subdivision
thereof. . .) from the levy or collection of taxes other than those enumerated in
subsection (a) of this section, including property taxes, net income taxes, franchise
taxes, and sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services; and nothing in this
section shall prohibit a State (or political subdivision thereof. . .) owning or oper-
ating an airport from levying or collecting reasonable rental charges, landing fees,
and other service charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities.
49 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (1976).
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Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 78 upheld the Airport Development Accelera-
tion Act, adopting an approach similar to that taken in Cocreham that
exhibited little deference to state sovereignty. In a short opinion marked
by little discussion, the court concluded that the federal law was enacted
pursuant to Congress' constitutional authority to regulate interstate com-
merce.
79
In the Securities Act Amendments of 1975,80 Congress adopted an ap-
proach somewhat analogous to that taken in Public Law 86-272 and re-
stricted state taxation stemming from the change in beneficial or record
ownership of securities based only on the physical location of the facilities
of registered clearing agencies or registered transfer agents. Congress,
however, did not restrict states from the imposition of taxes with regard to
the change of securities ownership based upon any other factor that might
subject the change in ownership to state taxation. s t Although there are no
cases determining the constitutionality of this section of the Securities Act
Amendments, this statute, like Public Law 86-272, is based on the congres-
sional exercise of the power to regulate commerce and would appear to be
well within the authority of that power.
In the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1975,82
Congress prohibited states from taxing railroad property more heavily
78. 453 Pa. 181, 309 A.2d 157 (1973).
79. 453 Pa. at 186, 309 A.2d at 159. The court concluded that once Congress exercised
its authority over interstate commerce, "that field is not available for state or local action."
Id.
80. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 21, 89 Stat. 1970 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(d) (1976)) states:
No State or political subdivision thereof shall impose any tax on any change in
beneficial or record ownership of securities effected through the facilities of a regis-
tered clearing agency or registered transfer agent or any nominee thereof or custo-
dian therefor or upon the delivery or transfer of securities to or through or receipt
from such agency or agent or any nominee thereof or custodian therefor, unless
such change is beneficial or record ownership or such transfer or delivery or receipt
would otherwise be taxable by such State or political subdivision if the facilities of
such registered clearing agency, registered transfer agent, or any nominee thereof
or custodian therefor were not physically located in the taxing State or political
subdivision. No State or political subdivision thereof shall impose any tax on se-
curities which are deposited in or retained by a registered clearing agency, regis-
tered transfer agent, or any nominee thereof or custodian therefor, unless such
securities would otherwise be taxable by such State or political subdivision if the
facilities of such registered clearing agency, registered transfer agent, or any nomi-
nee thereof or custodian therefor were not physically located in the taxing State or
political subdivision.
81. Id.
82. Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90 Stat. 51 (1976), 49 U.S.C.A. § 26c (West Supp. 1978)
states:
any action described in this subsection is declared to constitute an unreasonable
and unjust discrimination against, and an undue burden on, interstate commerce.
It is unlawful for a State, a political subdivision of a State, or a governmental entity
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than other industrial and commercial property. Likewise, in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976,83 Congress expressly restricted states from imposing or
assessing a tax on the generation or transmission of electricity if the tax
discriminated against out of state manufacturers, producers, wholesalers,
retailers, or consumers of that electricity. For purposes of the Tax Reform
Act, a tax will be found to be discriminatory "if it results, either directly or
indirectly, in a greater tax burden on electricity which is generated or
transmitted in interstate commerce than on electricity which is generated
or transmitted in intrastate commerce."' 84 While no cases have yet deter-
mined the constitutionality of either the Railroad Revitalization and Reg-
ulatory Reform Act of 1975 or the Tax Reform Act of 1976, these statutes,
as limitations of state taxing power, are based both upon Congress' exer-
cise of its constitutional power to regulate commerce as well as the existing
constitutional prohibition against discriminatory state taxes found in the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, these two
acts would appear to be clearly within Congress' authority.
Despite these legislative actions, a divergence of views exists over the
extent to which the states' power to tax interstate businesses may be re-
stricted in the name of congressional power to regulate commerce. Profes-
sor Hellerstein of New York University Law School strongly argues that
Congress has the power under the commerce clause to compel the states to
use uniform methods to apportion multistate and multinational income.
85
or person acting on behalf of such State or subdivision to commit any of the fol-
lowing prohibited acts:
(a) The assessment (but only to the extent of any portion based on excessive
values as hereinafter described), for purposes of a property tax levied by any
taxing district, of transportation property at a value which bears a higher ratio to
the true market value of such transportation property than the ratio which the
assessed value of all other commercial and industrial property in the same as-
sessment jurisdiction bears to the true market value of all such other commercial
and industrial property.
(b) The levy or collection of any tax on an assessment which is unlawful
under subdivision (a).
(c) The levy or collection of any ad valorem property tax on transportation
property at a tax rate higher than the tax rate generally applicable to commercial
and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.
(d) The imposition of any other tax which results in discriminatory treat-
ment of a common carrier by railroad subject to this chapter.
83. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2121, 90 Stat. 1914 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976)) states
in relevant part: "No State, or political subdivision thereof, may impose or assess a tax on or
with respect to the generation or transmission of electricity which discriminates against out-
of-State manufacturers, producers, wholesalers, retailers, or consumers of that electricity."
84. Id.
85. Hellerstein, The Power of Congress to Restrict State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, 12 J. TAx. 302 (1960). Professor Hellerstein begins with the proposition that the
underlying controversy concerns the taxation by states of income derived from interstate
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In contradistinction, Robert Roland, Collector of Revenue for the State of
Louisiana, strongly argues that the commerce clause is not a sufficient con-
stitutional grant of power on which to base Public Law 86-272, much less
any legislation which would force some sort of uniform method upon the
states for the apportionment of income derived from interstate business.
86
The problem with the views of Professor Hellerstein and Mr. Roland is
that they neglect the fact that two constitutional powers are competing for
prominence. If one focuses on the commerce clause, then the undeniable
conclusion is that the federal government may almost unconditionally
limit state power to tax interstate businesses. If instead one focuses on the
sovereign power of the states to tax, then the undeniable conclusion is that
the federal government may not unduly limit such power. The better view,
however, is that the question of the extent to which Congress may limit the
states' taxing power should be analyzed by balancing competing and legiti-
mate constitutional powers.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Because the national economy does not easily adjust to the artificial po-
litical lines of state borders, Congress may deem it appropriate to provide
some guidance for states and interstate businesses in the area of state taxa-
tion of interstate commerce. At least one authority has suggested that a
real need exists for such guidance. 87 The proper question therefore focuses
commerce. Id. at 302. Once it is understood that interstate commerce is involved, Professor
Hellerstein concludes that Congress has the power to deal with interstate commerce in any
manner it deems appropriate by virtue of the commerce clause. Id. at 303.
To bolster his position, Professor Hellerstein analogizes to those cases invoking the com-
merce clause as the legitimate source for congressional action. See United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, § 15, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (1976)) and
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, §§ 1 to 10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 to 160 (1976)).
86. Roland, Public Law 86-272.: Regulation or Raid, 46 VA. L. REV. 1172 (1960). Mr.
Roland expresses his belief that state taxation of income "does not affect interstate com-
merce as to make congressional limitations thereof an appropriate means to the attainment
of a legitimate end." Id. at 1187.
Roland also argues that state income taxes are ultimately based on income derived within
the state and as a result should not be considered to be the taxation of income derived from
interstate trade. Id. at 1173. Both arguments are valid, however, only in the circumstance of
an entirely intrastate operation, for it cannot realistically be argued that profits of an inter-
state business are derived only from intrastate commerce.
87. Studenski, supra note 64. Professor Studenski points out that double taxation of the
same income may result when states use allocation formulas which focus on different fac-
tors. For example, state X may allocate income on the basis of sales and state Y may allo-
cate income emphasizing the situs of manufacturing operations. The company that
manufactures widgets in state Y and sells those widgets in state X may very well be taxed
twice on the same income. Id. at 1133. Double taxation, of course, leads to more disputes
with state tax administrators. Id. at 1133-34. Moreover, Professor Studenski argues that it is
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on the manner in which Congress may constitutionally provide such gui-
dance while giving sufficient deference to the sovereignty of the states.
88
Several options exist. The two previous laws passed by Congress that
restrict state taxing authority and which have been adjudged to be consti-
tutional8 9 offer lessons for future attempts at finding the "delicate adjust-
ment between the national interest . . . and the legitimate interest of the
individual States." 9 The approach taken by the Airport Development Ac-
celeration Act9' broadly restricts states from imposing taxes or "other
charges" with respect to air commerce, but exempts from this broad re-
striction certain types of taxes such as property, income, franchise, and
sales or use taxes. The exempted taxes are, of course, the major revenue
sources for states and, accordingly, the Act effectively balances national
interests and those of the states' revenue needs with respect to air com-
merce.
Another option would be to follow the approach taken in Public Law
86-272,92 the other statute determined to be constitutional, which defined
the minimum jurisidictional standards required to be met before a state
can impose an income tax. Jurisdictional standards of the sort embodied
in Public Law 86-272 mandate only that a sufficient minimum amount of
activity be carried on in the state seeking to impose an income tax before
the tax can be imposed. These "minimum amount of activities" standards
facilitate interstate commerce by setting forth bright line tests with which
interstate traders can comply while at the same time not causing a signifi-
cant drain on any state treasury. Moreover, bright line tests also facilitate
the work of the various state tax administrators.
Portions of Senator Mathias' bill, S. 2173, 93 set forth further jurisdic-
often difficult for smaller corporate taxpayers to comply with the multitude of different state
taxing schemes. Id. at 1138-39.
88. To give sufficient deference to the sovereignty of the states in this context necessarily
means that the interests of the states in the area of state taxation of interstate trade must be
adequately considered. The two main state interests in this regard are: (1) the ability effec-
tively to administer state taxing schemes; and (2) the ability effectively to raise adequate
revenues in an equitable manner so that all taxpayers with a sufficient connection with the
state (whether primarily engaged in interstate trade or not) are paying their "fair share" of
state taxes. Interview with Jonathan A. Rowe, Deputy Executive Director of the Multistate
Tax Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 21, 1978).
89. See text accompanying notes 70-79 supra.
90. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1973). See text
accompanying note 59 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
92. See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra.
93. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. S 16232-38 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1977). S. 2173 was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate
Finance Committee. Neither reported it out of Committee. Accordingly the bill died when
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tional parameters. For example, section 101 of S. 2173 prohibited a state
from requiring any person to collect a sales or use tax in regard to the sale
of tangible personal property unless the person has a business location in
the taxing state or the person regularly makes household deliveries in that
state.94 Further, section 117(d), entitled, "Continuation of Minimal Juris-
dictional Standard," extended the restrictions on state income taxes found
in Public Law 86-27295 to state sales and use taxes. 96 Another example of
the use of this approach is found in section 201 of S. 2173, which prohib-
ited states from imposing a gross receipts tax in regard to the interstate sale
of tangible personal property, unless the sale was solicited through a busi-
ness office of the seller in the taxing state.97 These portions of Senator
Mathias' bill extending the minimum jurisdictional standards presently
found in Public Law 86-272 would presumably have withstood constitu-
tional attack. These provisions did not require states to adopt a particular
method of taxation, but rather required that minimum connections exist
the 95th Congress adjourned. Mathias intends to reintroduce the bill, however, during the
next congressional session. [1978] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) J-I (Nov. 15, 1978).
94. Section 101 stated:
No State or political subdivision thereof shall have power to require a person to
collect a sales or use tax with respect to a sale of tangible personal property unless
the person has a business location in the State or regularly makes household deliv-
eries in the State.
S. 2173 at § 101, reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. at S16233.
95. See notes 70-72 and accompanying text supra.
96. The provisions of § 117(d), a part of S. 2173's Title 1, Sales and Use Taxes, stated:
An employee shall not be considered to be located in a State if his only business
activities within such State on behalf of his employer are any or all of the follow-
ing:
(1) The solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal property, which
are sent outside the State for approval or rejection and (if approved) are filled by
shipment or delivery from a point outside the State.
(2) The solicitation of orders for sales of or for the benefit of a prospective
customer of his employer, if orders by such customer to such employer to enable
such customer to fill orders resulting from such solicitation are orders described
in paragraph (1).
(3) The installing or repairing of tangible personal property which is the sub-
ject of an interstate sale by the employer, if such installation or repair is inciden-
tal to the sale.
This subsection shall not apply with respect to business activities carried on by one
or more employees within a State if the employer (without regard to those employ-
ees) has a business location in such State.
S. 2173 at § l17(d), reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. at S16234.
97. Section 201 stated:
No State or political subdivision thereof shall have power to impose a gross re-
ceipts tax with respect to the interstate sales of tangible personal property unless
the sale is solicited directly through a business office of the seller in the State or
political subdivision.
S. 2173 at § 201, reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. at S16234.
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between the state seeking to impose a particular tax and the persons or
activities being taxed. As with Public Law 86-272, such "minimum
amount of activities" standards presumably would facilitate interstate
commerce and not cause a significant reduction of state revenues while at
the same time simplifying the work of the various state tax administrators.
This is not to say, however, that framing a statute in terms of a mini-
mum jurisdictional standard will always meet constitutional demands.
For example, Congress could pass a bill prohibiting states from taxing in-
come derived from interstate commerce by establishing a minimum juris-
dictional standard restricting state taxation to income derived solely from
intrastate business. Such a restriction would cause large reductions in state
revenues and entirely exempt interstate traders from paying their fair share
of state taxes. Such a substantial reduction of the states' sovereign power
to tax with the resultant revenue loss would presumably "devour the essen-
tials of state sovereignty" 98 and outweigh the exercise of the congressional
power to regulate commerce. As a result, such a statute, if ever passed,
would violate the Constitution.
Another equally unpalatable option would be to follow the approach
taken in article 9(4) of the proposed Tax Convention with the United
Kingdom. 99 Such a restriction could be imposed on the states either on a
treaty by treaty basis or by statute. As previously discussed, article 9(4)
would have forbidden state use of any formula for determining income for
British branch operations and businesses which are directly or indirectly
controlled by British enterprises.Ic° Any restriction on the states that
would prohibit the use of such methods for allocating taxable business in-
come would be a significant curtailment of state taxing authority. Without
the use of such formulas, a state would be required to account separately
for income generated within a state when business activities were also car-
ried on outside state borders. One of the main concerns to state govern-
ments in the area of state taxation of interstate trade is the concern that
states retain their ability to administer state taxing schemes effectively.' 0 '
The current ability of state tax administrators simply to use an arbitrary
formula rather than a subjective standard 10 2 certainly eases the difficulty
98. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976). See text accompany-
ing notes 50-55 supra.
99. See notes 8-16 and accompanying text supra.
100. See notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text supra.
101. See note 88 supra.
102. Without arbitrary formulas, state tax administrators would be forced to use subjec-
tive standards such as I.R.C. § 482, which requires the Internal Revenue Service to "dis-
tribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances" between
businesses that are jointly owned or controlled whenever "such distribution, apportionment,
or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income
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inherent in the allocation of income. The type of restriction that would
prohibit the use of such apportionment formulas would result in a signifi-
cant reduction of the states' sovereign taxing power. Accordingly, the
harm inherent in this type of restriction would presumably outweigh the
benefits of such an exercise of congressional power to regulate commerce
and, as with the previous example, should be found to be violative of the
Constitution.
Congress could, however, in the interest of establishing a uniform
method for the division of income among states, mandate that all states
allocate income on the basis of a particular formula method. An appealing
formula method, which apportions income by taking into account intra-
state payroll, sales, and property and comparing that to out-of-state pay-
roll, sales, and property, is set forth in Article IV of the Uniform Division
of Income for Tax Purposes Act.103 In the event that Congress did man-
date a particular formula method, the possibility of duplicative income
taxation by the states would be significantly eliminated at least in regard to
multistate business and would therefore benefit interstate commerce. In
of any of" such businesses. For a discussion concerning the difficulties in administering
I.R.C. § 482, see Comment, Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation Under Section
482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1976).
103. See UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT, art. 4 [hereinafter
cited as UNIFORM ACT]. The Uniform Act was adopted by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1959. It was designed as a model act for states to follow in order to aid
taxpayer compliance and eliminate the possibility of double taxation of multistate busi-
nesses. The Act is set forth in 7A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 91 (West 1978). Perhaps its most
important provision is one providing for an apportionment formula that takes into account
payroll, sales and property. See UNIFORM ACT at art. IV. It also established a Multistate
Tax Commission with the mandate to recommend proposals for the increase in uniformity
between different state tax laws. See id. at art. VI. As of this date, 28 states have adopted
the model act. Interview with Jonathan A. Rowe, Deputy Executive Director of the Multi-
state Tax Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 1, 1978). For an example of the enacted
law, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 871 (1971).
The Multistate Tax Compact, a model legislation package, has been entered into by a
number of states to provide state rather than federal remedies for the problems arising from
the taxation of multistate business. MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, preamble at C-3 to C-4.
Nineteen states are currently members of the Compact. Interview with Jonathan N. Rowe,
Deputy Executive Director of the Multistate Tax Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Nov.
27, 1978). For a full listing of these states, see United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 454 n.1 (1978). The stated purposes of the Compact include the
facilitation of proper determination of state and local tax liability; the promotion of uni-
formity and compatibility in state taxing systems; and the avoidence of duplicative taxation.
MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, art I.
Although all Compact members are free to retain their existing division of income provi-
sions, they are required to make the UNIFORM ACT available to any taxpayer wishing to use
it. "Consequently, any taxpayer could obtain the benefits of multijurisdictional uniformity
whenever he might want it." Id. at preamble, C-4.
The Compact recently survived attacks on its constitutionality in United States Steel
Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
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view of the substantial benefits interstate commerce would derive from a
uniform formula and in view of the ease of administration of such a
method for state tax administrators, the legitimacy of such a congressional
exercise of its power to regulate commerce would presumably outweigh
this type of limitation on the states' taxing power and accordingly should
be determined to be constitutional.
Another option available to Congress is a variant of the option just dis-
cussed and was set forth in Title III of Senator Mathias' bill, S. 2173.104
Under this option, a state would not have been allowed to impose on a
corporation taxable in more than one state a net income tax in excess of an
amount determined by an apportionment formula taking into account
property, payroll, and sales. 105 Section 302 of that bill, however, exempted
from taxable income all foreign source income as defined by the Internal
Revenue Code, 10 6 as well as all dividend income received from corpora-
tions in which the corporate taxpayer owns fifty percent or more of the
voting stock. 10 7 These exemptions would have decreased the state revenue
of those states that presently include such income. Further, section 303(a)
of Senator Mathias' bill permitted states either to require or a corporation
to elect that the determination of taxable corporate income be computed
with reference to the group of commonly owned corporations of which the
104. 95th Cong., ist Sess. (1977), reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. S16232-38 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1977).
105. Section 301 provided:
A State or a political subdivision thereof may not impose for any taxable year on
a corporation taxable in more than one State, other than an excluded corporation,
a net income tax measured by an amount of net income in excess of the amount
determined by (1) multiplying the corporation's base by an apportionment fraction
which is the average of the corporation's equally-weighted property, payroll, and
sales factors for the State for the taxable year and (2) adding to the amount deter-
mined under clause (1) the amount of income allocable to the State for the taxable
year. For this purpose the base to which the apportionment fraction is applied
shall be the corporation's apportionable income as defined in this title for that
taxable year. No State shall, by reason of not including dividends or foreign
source income in apportionable income, make any offsetting adjustment of an
otherwise allowable deduction which is unrelated to such excluded dividends or
foreign source income.
S. 2173, § 301, reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. S 16232, S 16234 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1977).
106. See I.R.C. §§ 861 to 864.
107. Section 302 stated:
Dividends received from corporations in which the taxpayer owns less than 50
percent of the voting stock, other than dividends which constitute foreign source
income, are income allotable to the State of commercial domicile of such taxpayer.
No dividends' received from corporations in which the taxpayer owns 50 percent or
more of the voting stock and no foreign source income of such taxpayer shall be
apportionable or allocable to any State.
S. 2173, § 302, reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. at S 16234.
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corporate taxpayer is a member. 10 8 Section 303(b) of S. 2173, however,
would expressly have limited states from including in such a group of com-
monly owned corporations any financial institutions or any corporation
whose income is substantially derived from foreign sources. 10 9 At the
same time, that subsection nevertheless did not preclude a corporate tax-
payer from including such affiliates if it were advantageous to do so. Be-
cause the bill proposed this one-sided advantage for corporate taxpayers, it
would have undoubtedly caused revenue losses for states. Corporate tax-
payers, which include affiliated financial institutions whose income is sub-
stantially derived from foreign sources, would include this income only
when it would reduce state tax obligations. Even though the approach
found in Title III of S. 2173 is based initially on a uniform apportionment
formula,"10 the added conditions limiting state application accompanied
by the resultant loss of state revenues are the sorts of curtailment of state
taxing authority that would presumably outweigh the exercise of the con-
gressional power to regulate commerce. Consequently, this sort of restric-
tion should be found to constitute a "usurpation of power not granted by
the Constitution."'''I
Congress has yet another option, albeit draconian, which would give the
states a choice between losing revenue sharing payments 1 2 or accepting a
108. Section 303(a) provided:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), any State may require, or a
corporation may elect, that the taxable income of the corporation be determined by
reference to the combined or consolidated net income and the combined or consol-
idated apportionment factors of all affiliated corporations in the affiliated group of
which the corporation is a member.
S. 2173, § 303(a), reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. at S16234.
109. Section 303(b) provides:
(b) No State may require, for purposes of subsection (a), that a combination or
consolidation of an affiliated group include-
(1) any excluded corporation, or
(2) any corporation, substantially all the income of which is derived from
sources without the United States.
For purposes of this subsection, substantially all the income of a corporation
(whether a domestic or a foreign corporation) shall be deemed to be derived from
sources without the United States if 80 percent or more of its gross income is de-
rived from sources without the United States in the current taxable year and in
each of the two preceding taxable years (excluding any period during which such
corporation was not in existence).
S. 2173, § 303(b), reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. at S 16234.
110. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
111. See THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (A. Hamilton) at 208 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See text
accompanying note 55 supra.
112. "Under a revenue sharing strategy a portion of federal tax receipts is disbursed by
means of a predetermined formula to state and local governments, with a few strings at-
tached." L. FRIED, A. RIVLIN, C. SCHULTZE, & N. TEETERS, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORI-
TIES-THE 1974 TAX BUDGET 266 (Brookings Institute 1973).
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restriction on their sovereign taxing power. In this circumstance, the re-
striction on the states' sovereign tax authority could be most severe. This
approach may, nonetheless, be constitutional. As noted by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia in County of Los Angeles
v. Marshall: "legislation that allows the state a choice-to avoid enacting
a scheme that may interfere with its sovereignty-does not directly inter-
fere with a state's sovereignty and is not in the violation of the tenth
amendment."" 13 If the Congress deemed this approach appropriate, there
would be no need to balance the competing constitutional powers of the
states' taxing authority and the congressional power to regulate commerce
because the states would waive their constitutional argument if revenue
sharing payments were accepted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of any alternative, the Supreme Court's command in
Moorman that "the consent of any uniform rules . . . should be deter-
mined only after due consideration is given to the interest of all affected
States," 4 must be heeded. Due to the substantial congressional interest
provoked by state taxation of multistate businesses since the Supreme
Court's 1959 pronouncement in Northwestern States, it is likely that Con-
gress will eventually take some sort of action. The optimum congressional
solution must strike that delicate balance between the sovereignty of the
states to structure their tax laws to provide themselves with adequate reve-
nues and the desirability of the minimum amount of interference on the
national economy.
113. 442 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (D.D.C. 1977) (emphasis in original). The court in
Marshall rejected the state challenge to the implementation of the Unemployment Compen-
sation Amendments of 1976, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301 to 3311 (1976), which require state and local
governments to finance unemployment benefits of such governments' former employees.
Failure of the state and local governments to enact conforming legislation results in the
denial of a federal tax credit to private employers and the loss to the state of certain federal
reimbursements. Distinguishing the case from National League of Cities, see text accompa-
nying notes 50-55 supra, the district court noted that "the imposition of an unemployment
compensation scheme is at the option of the state." 442 F. Supp. at 1190. Although the
plaintiffs attempted to label any "choice" made by the states as "illusory" and in reality
"coerced," the court viewed the attached federal strings as merely congressional "motive."
Id. at 1190-91. Indeed, "Congress has great latitude in fixing the terms upon which its
money allotment. . . may be conditioned. . . . This Court finds that it is within the power
of Congress to attempt to deal with the problems of unemployment by inducing the states to
extend unemployment compensation to public employees." Id. at 1191.
114. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978). See notes 63-67 and accom-
panying text supra.
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